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RIGHTS OF ENTITLEMENT:
A ROMAN CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVE
KENNETH R. HIMES, O.F.M.*
I. INTRODUCTION
To every action there is a reaction. That basic axiom has
once again been proven valid not only in physics but politics. As
commentator after commentator has observed, the decades of
the sixties and seventies were a period in which more and more
people claimed more and more rights. Indeed, there was a veri-
table explosion of rights-language. All manner of disputes were
described as conflicts over rights; almost every incident of injus-
tice was portrayed as a violation of rights; all sorts of public com-
plaints stemmed from a failure to acknowledge the alleged rights
of the offended party. Now, in the nineties, the reaction has set
in and people across the spectrum of political ideologies are
reconsidering the way Americans have used (exploited?) the dis-
course of rights.
A watershed period for the language of rights in this nation
occurred during the fifties and sixties with the civil rights move-
ment. As legal scholars know, the issues of constitutional law
which were argued before the U.S. Supreme Court previous to
that time were largely focused on the relation between federal
and state authority or the division of power among the three
branches of the federal government. Cases of personal liberty -
free speech, rights of defendants, freedom of association - were
either not litigated or viewed as matters for state courts. As the
incorporation doctrine based on the Fourteenth Amendment
developed and the Bill of Rights was taken to apply to states as
well as the federal government, there was an acceleration ofjudi-
cial review by the Supreme Court in order to protect individual
rights. Now in the present age, the greatest number of cases
before the Court address claims that an individual's right has
been violated.1
* Professor of Moral Theology, Washington Theological Union. This
article was written while serving as Visiting Professor and holder of the Paul
McKeever Chair of Moral Theology at St. John's University, Jamaica, NY.
1. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTs TALK 3 (1991). I have relied upon
Glendon for much of this introduction. See chapter 1 of her book.
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As a result of the concentration on the Bill of Rights and the
courts, the locus of attention for social reformers came to be the
judiciary rather than the legislature since the "test case [w]as
preferable to ordinary politics."2 Much of this was understanda-
ble, given the experience of civil rights activists. Years and years
of working with prejudiced local officials and entrenched opposi-
tion in county and state governments led to frustration and disil-
lusionment. When compared to the sweeping change ushered in
by Brown v. Board of Education and the moral legitimacy given the
civil rights movement by a unanimous Supreme Court decision,
the traditional approach of working through political debate and
legislation seemed inefficient and inadequate.
In retrospect, one can see that many people came to expect
too much from the courts and too little from politics. As time
went on it was not only the Supreme Court but lower federal
courtjudges who took on activist roles "using their remedial pow-
ers to oversee the everyday operations of prison, hospitals, and
school systems."4 All of this led to America becoming a land
obsessed with the language of rights and where litigation and
legal briefs replaced political organization and legislation as the
preferred strategy for achieving social reform.
A mistake by way of reaction to this development, however,
would be to dismiss the language of rights altogether. It is not
that the idea of rights per se is wrong, but rather that a new way of
talking about rights has crept into our public discourse. As Mary
Ann Glendon has written, "current American rights talk is but
one dialect in a universal language" which has evolved during a
period of intense focus on civil and human rights. The Ameri-
can dialect of rights-language is different than that spoken in
other liberal democracies due to "its starkness and simplicity, its
prodigality in bestowing the rights label, its legalistic character,
its exaggerated absoluteness, its hyper individualism, its insular-
ity, and its silence with respect to personal, civic and collective
responsibilities."5 Rights are played like trump cards to cut off
discussion and debate, suggesting that complex issues can be
resolved merely by announcing a claim. All manner of rights
have been asserted to give humans claims to all sorts of wants and
desires, and the roster of claims has even been extended to
include non-humans. When all public controversy is framed as
an instance of rights in conflict, it is hard to find a middle
2. Id
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 7.
5. Id. atx.
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ground where compromise or consensus can attain public peace.
The temptation to think of rights as absolutes which admit of no
exception or regulation creates an air of unreality in public life,
and the spotlight given to rights puts the language of duty and
responsibility in the shadows of our social life. It is as if "our
current rights talk is a verbal caricature of our culture - recog-
nizably ours, but with certain traits wildly out of proportion and
with some of our best features omitted."'
A special concern for rights-talk, highlighted in this nation
by the current debates over government social spending, are
those rights called entitlements or social welfare rights. Entitle-
ments come in all shapes and sizes: there are direct payments
like farm program subsidies and social security checks; then
there are entitlements in the form of tax breaks like the home
mortgage deduction; and entitlements also come in the form of
services like Medicare coverage. In the minds of many Ameri-
cans these examples are not entitlements, however, for that term
conjures up an image of the poor getting government aid. Con-
sequently, although government spending on the non-poor far
exceeds expenditures directed to the poor, it is the entitlement
programs aimed at the poor which have received the scrutiny of
the budget-cutters and provided ammunition to the enemies of
big government. So when thinking about the specific rights we
call entitlements, it is important to see that within the American
context welfare rights or entitlements are not all equal.
What Americans understand by welfare is different than
what most of our European allies mean by the idea of welfare or
entitlement rights. In these other nations welfare is understood
to encompass social expenditures for education, health, old age,
and unemployment insurance. All but education is understood
as an insurance program to which individuals make contribu-
tions during their working lives; while education is paid for by a
tax. All four programs are meant to cover the entire population.
Those people requiring more are expected to be small in
number since if people have received a good basic education and
have adequate health care the presumption is that most people
will be able to be self-supporting. But there is the realization that
some folks will require greater assistance from social workers,
child care providers, or special occupational training. For a vari-
ety of historical and cultural reasons, Americans have always
drawn a sharp line between programs of the second type and
those of the first. Perhaps it is that our pioneer and immigrant
experiences have encouraged self-reliance, or it may be that our
6. Id. at xii.
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racial and ethnic divisions have prevented a spirit of national soli-
darity; but for whatever reason(s) the United States has taken a
different approach than our European counterparts. The two
great exceptions to this general national consciousness in
America were the New Deal and the Great Society eras.7
Interestingly, the Roman Catholic Church, after centuries of
shying away from rights-language, has become one of the great
exponents of rights in its social teaching. Why that is so and what
the Catholic Church's teaching on rights has to offer the
national debate in the U.S. is the subject matter of this essay.
Before proceeding with a treatment of the why and what of the
Catholic perspective, however, it will be useful to review the dis-
tant context of the present American dispute over rights which is
to a large extent, though not exclusively, an argument over
entitlements.'
II. LIBERALISM AND RIGHTS-LANGUAGE
Liberalism in the English-speaking world, as articulated by
John Locke, was a theory born out of the changing dynamics of
an evolving social order. It gave a prominent place to the idea of
rights. The world of Locke was no longer the medieval world, as
a new order was emerging after the decline of the great institu-
tions of empire and papacy. The loss of power by these formida-
ble social forces was accompanied by a rise in prestige and
influence of the nation-state. This new locus of social power
increasingly sought to acquire the prerogatives previously
reserved to the emperor and pope. Even though this occurred
largely for pragmatic reasons, there was need for a theory to
explain such a series of events. How might this new sovereign
power of the leader of the nation-state be justified? Since the
deity was the source of all power, the new monarchs had to
demonstrate how they legitimated their authority and this was
done through the theory of the divine right of kings. In the face
of this development, there was the sharply felt need for a coun-
7. See NATHAN GILAZER, THE LIMrrs OF Soci.L PoLcY 168 (1988). For a
brief historical overview of social welfare policy in the U.S. during this century
see CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY 1-23 (1993).
8. I say not exclusively since some of the current controversy entails
differences about civil liberties. For example, use of the internet to transmit
offensive pictures and language, freedom to burn the American flag, regulation
and licensing of guns for personal use, freedom to procure an abortion, to
marry a partner of the same sex - all of these are issues which evoke strong
disagreement among citizens today. Entitlements are a particular form of
discourse about rights but not the only or necessarily the most important nor
the most controversial.
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tervailing force to balance the claims of the monarch; but
because all other groups, including churches, had come to be
dependent on the state, no rival social institutions able to play
that balancing role were apparent.
It was in such a context that John Locke wrote his treatises
on government.9 His was, a theory which sought to defend the
individual from the absolutist claims of monarchs. In doing this
he proposed that there were rights which each person possessed
and which made certain realms of life sacrosanct and immune
from state power.10 Although Locke never used the term in his
writing, these rights came to be called "natural rights." It was this
notion of the individual, invested with rights in a state of nature
prior to the construction of the state, which was to serve as a
bulwark against the overreaching ambitions of the new national
monarchs.1 ' Liberalism, then, was forged in the struggle to
9. JoHN LOCKE, Two TREATiSES OF GOVERNMENT (W.S. Carpenter ed.)
(1966).
10.Though the legislative, whether placed in one or more, whether it
be always in being or only by intervals, though it be the supreme
power in every commonwealth, yet, first, it is not, nor can possibly be,
absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people. For it
being but the joint power of every member of the society given up to
that person or assembly which is legislator, it can be no more than
those persons had in a state of Nature before they entered into society,
and gave it up to the community. For nobody can transfer to another
more power than he has in himself, and nobody has an absolute
arbitrary power over himself, or over any other, to destroy his own life,
or take away the life or property of another. A man, as has been
proved, cannot subject himself to the arbitrary power of another; and
having, in the state of Nature, no arbitrary power over the life, liberty,
or possession of another, but only so much as the law of Nature gave
him for the preservation of himself and the rest of mankind, this is all
he doth, or can give up to the commonwealth, and by it to the
legislative power, so that the legislative can have no more than this.
Their power in the utmost bounds of it is limited to the public good of
the society. It is a power that hath no other end but preservation, and
therefore can never have a right to destroy, enslave, or designedly to
impoverish the subjects; the obligations of the law of Nature cease not
in society, but only in many cases are drawn closer, and have, by
human laws, known penalties annexed to them to enforce their
observation.
Id. at 185.
11. [T] he supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his
property without his own consent. For the preservation of property
being the end of government, and that for which men enter into
society, it necessarily supposes and requires that the people should
have property, without which they must be supposed to lose that by
entering into society which was the end for which they entered into it;
too gross an absurdity for any man to own. Men, therefore, in society
having property, they have such a right to the goods, which by the law
1997]
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defend individual liberty against the power of the state as embod-
ied in the monarch. "This confrontation of crown and subject
and the discussion of the relations between them has character-
ized the whole life and thought of the politics of modern man."12
The appeal to rights served the purpose of maintaining and
securing that natural freedom of the individual which Locke pro-
posed as the human condition prior to the social contract.1" The
state is created by that contract as a convenient instrument for
the protection of pre-existent rights, preserving an individual's
right to security in the exercise of other rights.14 Locke's theory
was a defense of certain spheres of immunity, of governmental
of the community are theirs, that nobody hath a right to take them, or
any part of them, from them without their own consent; without this
they have no property at all. For I have truly no property in that which
another can by right take from me when he pleases against my
consent.
.s. This is not much to be feared in governments where the
legislative consists wholly or in part in assemblies which are variable,
whose members upon the dissolution of the assembly are subjects
under the common laws of their country, equally with the rest. But in
governments where the legislative is in one lasting assembly, always in
being, or in one man as in absolute monarchies, there is danger still,
that they will think themselves to have a distinct interest from the rest
of the community, and so will be apt to increase their own riches and
power by taking what they think fit from the people.
Id. at 188.
12. CHARLES VEREKER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF PoLITIcAL THEORY 85
(1965).
13.To understand political power aright, and derive it from its
original, we must consider what estate all men are naturally in, and
that is a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of
their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of
the law of Nature, without asking leave or depending upon the will of
any other man.
LocKE, supra note 9, at 118.
14. If man in the state of Nature be so free as has been said, if he be
absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest
and subject to nobody, why will he part with his freedom, this empire,
and subject himself to the dominion and control of any other power:
To which it is obvious to answer, that though in the state of Nature he
hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain and
constantly exposed to the invasion of others; for all being kings as
much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict
observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has
in this state is very unsafe, very insecure. This makes him willing to
quit this condition which, however free, is full of fears and continual
dangers; and it is not without reason that he seeks out and is willing to
join in society with others who are already united, or have a mind to
unite for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates,
which I call by the general name-property.
Id. at 179.
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non-intervention. Locke set the parameters for state activity by
elaborating the areas of life in which the individual had the free-
dom to act as one pleased. This belief, in rights of autonomy and
immunity from government action, grew in the West and was
enshrined in declarations in England, France, and the United
States.
Over time, the focus on individual freedom became concen-
trated on economic freedom. More than a century after Locke,
Adam Smith and other social theorists encouraged the viewpoint
that the freedom of the market was a crucial locus for individual
liberty.15 Guided by an "invisible hand" the exercise of individ-
ual liberty would also lead to the general welfare of society.16
Thus, economic liberty was made central to any strategy for
human well-being, and the Lockean right of private property was
interpreted to include the new forms of property being pro-
duced under industrial capitalism. The "natural" working of the
market, the laws of supply and demand, became identified with
the natural law which governed human behavior. To work
against such laws was both folly and wrong.17 Until the second
15. "For Smith capitalism is essential because it was the period of history
in which freedom appeared. Smith sees commercial society, as he designates
the early capitalism of his day, as a time in which 'natural liberty' finally
emerges as the organizing principle of society, in place of feudal or mercantilist
restrictions." Robert Heilbroner, The Man and His Times, in THE EssENTAL
ADAm SMIrII 8-9 (Robert Heilbroner & Laurence Malone eds.) (hereinafter
ESSENTIAL ADaM SMrrH). In Smith's view once society had progressed beyond
earlier forms of economic arrangements by adopting capitalism the inevitable
result would be liberty. "All systems either of preference or of restraint,
therefore, being thus completely taken away, the obvious and simple system of
natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord." ADAm SMrrH, THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS, Bk. 1V, ch. 9, in EsSENTIAL ADAm SMrrH 289.
16.As every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can both
to employ his capital in support of domestic industry, and so direct
that industry that its produce may be of the greatest value; every
individual necessarily labours to make render the annual revenue of
the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to
promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it.
By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he
intends only his own security, and by directing that industry in such a
manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his
own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible
hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it
always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing
his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more
effectually than when he really intends to promote it.
SMrrH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, Bk. IV, ch. 2, in ESSENTIAL ADAm SMITH 265.
17.The natural effort of every individual to better his own condition,
when suffered to exert itself with freedom and security, is so powerful,
that it is alone, and without any assistance, not only capable of
1997] 513
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half of the nineteenth century, therefore, the efforts of most lib-
erals were directed toward enlarging and consolidating the lib-
erty of individuals, including their freedom in the marketplace,
from the encroachments of the state. Historically, this is the first
stage of liberal rights.
A second stage was to follow, and it was brought about by
new threats to human freedom. Locke's theory was an important
development in response to a clear threat, but times change and
new theories were formulated to respond to the new threats to
human well-being. As complex industrial societies emerged in
the West there was a perception that governmental non-interfer-
ence in the economy was not enough to guarantee personal lib-
erty. The exercise of individual freedom required certain pre-
conditions. There were other constraints on liberty besides abso-
lutist rulers which had to be taken into consideration. A number
of liberals began to acknowledge that the significant concentra-
tion of economic power in private hands could endanger persons
in a manner similar to how the concentration of political power
in the hands of a despotic state does.18 Thus, there arose a split
within liberalism, and one that was predictable, since utilitarian
liberals and free market liberals were not of one mind on the
right to economic freedom within a market system.
Utilitarians like Bentham and Mill were initially committed
to the free market because, like Smith before them, they thought
that a minimal state and unregulated economic liberty served the
good of all. But the harsh realities of an unchecked economic
liberty became too obvious to ignore in the later decades of the
nineteenth century. 9 To remedy the worst suffering, certain
carrying on the society to wealth and prosperity, but of surmounting a
hundred impertinent obstructions with which the folly of human laws
too often encumbers its operations.
As quoted without citation in ESSENTIAL ADAM SMIH 324.
18. D. D. Raphael, The Liberal Western Tradition of Human Rights, INT'L
Soc. Sci. J. 22 (1966) and J. H. Bums, The Rights of Man Since the Reformation, in
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF HuMAN RIGHTS 16-30 (Sir Francis Vallat ed.,
1972).
19. Mill, reflecting his classical liberal bias, makes clear that the burden
falls "not on those who resist, but on those who recommend, government
interference. Laissez-faire, in short, should be the general practice: every
departure from it, unless required by some great good, is a certain evil." He
then proceeds, however, in the same work to show that a number of exceptions
to the general practice should exist including funding of public education,
poor relief, limitations on the length of the workday, child labor laws and other
such reforms which were opposed by those liberals who saw such government
interventions as violations of free contract or the funding of which violated
property rights. JoHNs STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF PoLrlcAL ECONOMY 334-35
(Jonathan Riley ed., 1994).
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reforms, like female and child labor laws, became popular. Once
it was evident that some state regulation of the economic market-
place was enhancing the public good, the utilitarians supported
the state action. Utilitarians were able to embrace such social
reforms since their moral norm was the greatest happiness for
the greatest number.2" Free market liberals, however, held to
the earlier understanding of natural rights protecting freedom of
contract, private property, and general economic liberty. For
them it was not possible to jettison these rights in the name of
social utility because these rights were not a matter of means but
of fundamental principle. Utilitarians were disdainful of such
claims being used as obstacles to social change and, to use Ben-
tham's phrase, dismissed the talk of rights as "fictitious
entities."21
By the twentieth century another group of liberals sought to
reinvigorate rights-language while also permitting the sort of
state activity which free-market liberals opposed. These new lib-
erals, neither purely utilitarian nor committed free-marketeers,
believed that the classical civil and political rights of liberalism
ought still be honored but that these rights no longer stood
alone. A renewed rights-language evolved which gave voice to
people's claims to social and economic goods as well as civil and
political liberties. These proponents of social and economic
rights saw the state as a necessary agent to regulate the market
and private economic power, but as liberals they advocated civil
and political rights which limited both the manner and scope of
state activity. Rights were meant to serve freedom, the welfare
liberal maintained, but unchecked economic as well as political
power could undercut personal freedom.22 The free individual
required a set of economic and social entitlements to comple-
ment civil and political liberties. With this development the
framework was set within which many political disputes in the
English-speaking world took place. Free-market liberals, utilita-
rian liberals, and welfare-state liberals would continue the argu-
ment about how much state activity was proper and
20. Bentham, a notoriously convoluted writer, was always clear that the
fundamental axiom of social reform was simple: "It is the greatest happiness of
the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong." Jeremy Bentham,
A Fragment on Government, reprinted in A BENTHAM READER 45 (Mary Peter Mack
ed., 1969).
21. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
AND LEGISLATION, ch. 16, para. 25, n. e2 (J. H. Burns & H. L. A. Hart eds., 1982).
22. A brief and very clear account of the evolution of liberal thinking on
rights, governmental action and social change is JOHN DEwEY, LIBERALISM AND
SOCIAL ACTION (1935).
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advantageous; how much freedom there should be in the mar-
ketplace; and what was the greatest threat to personal liberty.
The unquestioned premise in the liberal argument was that free-
dom was the foundational touchstone.
III. THE RoMAN CATHOLIC HERITAGE
Roman Catholic social theory draws upon many sources, but
without question the medieval heritage has played a large part in
its formulation. Beyond the influence of any one thinker or
theme is a fundamental conviction which has served to guide the
development of the Church's teaching. That conviction is the
belief that society must be viewed organically. That is, society
viewed as an organism was differentiated, complementary, and
related. There were different parts to the social body, each part
made its contribution to the common good, and each part was
linked to the other through a hierarchical scheme of social rela-
tions. A consequence of this outlook was that emphasis was
placed on a person's duties in fulfilling his or her state in life
rather than on a person's rights. The differences of rank and
obligation within this scheme of social roles and duties was not
seen as arbitrary but based on right reason in its search for
appropriate means of attaining the common good. The social
hierarchy was an illustration of the great chain of being in which
all creation was ordered so as to reflect God's wisdom and plan.
Society is established neither because of sin nor the forma-
tion of a social contract but is due to the very nature of persons.
Sociality is understood to be as essential a part of our humanity
as rationality. That is, the person is viewed relationally - by the
relationships he or she has with God, other persons, other crea-
tures. Unlike the classical liberal model of society as a contract
between independent individuals, the medieval model empha-
sizes reciprocity and mutuality."3 If life is to flourish, it is neces-
sary for human beings to give and receive in relationships.
The Catholic tradition could not permit this communitarian
theme to lapse into a collectivism because of another aspect of
theological anthropology, namely, that each person is created in
the image and likeness of the Creator. Each person is viewed as
being worthy of care and concern, for as a creature loved by God
every person deserves to be treated reverently. The rational and
free nature of human beings means that no person could be
23. HENRiH A. ROMMEN, THE STATE IN CATHOLIC THOUGHT: A TREATISE
IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 123-36 (1945). Rommen's work is the best available
presentation of the classical Catholic understanding of the state's nature,
purpose and organization.
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treated simply as an instrument for a collective good. As a crea-
ture of God destined for union with God the dignity of the per-
son is to be served by society. The common good cannot be
defined in abstraction from the well-being of the individuals who
make up society. The personalist strain of Catholic social teach-
ing is directly tied to the underlying theological claim about the
origin and destiny of each person.
Catholic social teaching of the modern era, as articulated in
papal encyclicals, episcopal statements and conciliar decrees,
reflects the heritage of medieval thought (and biblical thought as
well) through its commitment to a communitarian outlook. As
the more recent teaching has revised and deepened its under-
standing of the person, it has given more weight to liberty and
equality than the medieval tradition but it has not abandoned
the foundational perspective of communitarianism.24 Without
question a major influence that has caused the revision and rear-
ticulation of the tradition has been Catholicism's encounter with
liberalism.25 The fruit of that dialogue has been an enriched
understanding of the person and the common good.
Nineteenth and early twentieth century popes expressed
serious reservations about many of the civil liberties championed
by liberalism.26 Freedom of speech and the press might permit
the propagation of error among a general population which
lacked the necessary abilities to discern properly. Freedom of
religion was particularly problematic since it seemed, in the eyes
24. MICHAELJ. ScHuCK, THAT THEY BE ONE: THE SOCIAL TEACHING OF THE
PAPAL ENCYCLICALS 1740-1989 (1991) provides a detailed and persuasive
account of communitarian thought being at the heart of Catholic social
teaching.
25. An excellent collection of essays which explores various dimensions of
this encounter is CATHOLiCIsM and LIBERALISM (R_ Bruce Douglass & David
Hollenbach eds., 1994).
26. Among the better known papal denunciations of liberal ideas is
MIRAi Vos promulgated by GREGORY XVI: "This shameful font of
indifferentism gives rise to that absurd and erroneous proposition which claims
that liberty of conscience must be maintained for everyone. . . . Thence comes
transformation of minds, corruption of youths, contempt of sacred things and
holy laws - in other words, a pestilence more deadly to the state than any
other." POPE GREGORY XVI, MIRAm Vos para. 14 (1832), in 1 THE PAPAL
ENCYLICALs 235, 238 (Claudia Carlen ed., 1981). "Here We must include that
harmful and never sufficiently denounced freedom to publish any writings
whatever and disseminate them to the people, which some dare to demand and
promote with so great a clamor." l at para. 15. A good overview of the early
papal reaction to liberalism can be found in Schuck, supra note 24, chapter 1.
More historical background on the early papal reaction is provided by Peter
Steinfels, The failed encounter: the Catholic church and liberalism in the nineteenth
century, in CATHOLICISM AND LIBERALISM, supra note 25, at 19-44.
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of the Church, to enshrine governmental indifference to reli-
gious truth which was a part of the common good. From the
papal perspective, what lay behind these alleged rights was liber-
alism's exaltation of the individual over all claims to divine truth,
revelation, tradition, and authority. Despite this suspicion, the
papacy, beginning with Leo XIII, began a dialogue with liber-
alism that eventually led to an appreciation of just how essential
an attribute personal freedom was for human dignity.2 7 By the
time of Vatican II the Church could celebrate freedom as a spe-
cial sign of the image of God within the person.28
Liberalism's advocacy of equality was also viewed skeptically
by a Church that spoke confidently about the duties of a person's
station in life. Demands for equality upset the stability of a social
order which the Church had presumed and heightened the
expectations of social change that might be destructive of the
class order and system of hierarchy familiar to ecclesiastical lead-
ers.29 Equality of dignity before God was, of course, central to
Catholic teaching, but the social implications of such a theologi-
cal conviction were not adequately grasped by the leadership of
the Catholic community. It was part of liberalism's achievement
that it helped induce the Church to reflect upon the political,
27. Leo engaged liberalism at several levels - philosophical, political,
economic. An example of his response to the philosophical challenge was
AETERNI PATRIS in 1879 where he called for a revival of Thomism in response to
the individualism and utilitarianism of liberalism. Among his many letters on
politics, government and democracy, ImmORTALE DEl in 1885 is perhaps the
most significant statement of the Leonine corpus on liberal political theory.
Undoubtedly, RERUM NovARn m in 1891 is the most important explanation of
the Catholic reaction to economic liberalism. All of these can be found in 2
TilE PAPAL ENCVCLICALS 17-27, 107-19, 241-61 (Claudia Carlen ed., 1981).
28. "For its part, authentic freedom is an exceptional sign of the divine
image within man." Gaudium et Spes: Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the
Modern World para. 17 (1965), in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: THE
DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE 166 (David J. O'Brien & Thomas A. Shannon eds.,
1992) (hereinafter CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT). As is customary with Church
documents, citations refer to paragraph, not page number.
29. Let it be laid down, in the first place, that humanity must remain as
it is. It is impossible to reduce human society to a level. . . . There
naturally exist among mankind innumerable differences of the most
important kind; people differ in capability, in diligence, in health, and
in strength; and unequal fortune is a necessary result of inequality in
condition. Such inequality is far from being disadvantageous either to
individuals or to the community; social and public life can only go on
by the help of various kinds of capacity and the playing of many parts,
and each man, as a rule, chooses the part which peculiarly suits his
case.
POPE LEO XlIl, RERuM NOVARUM para. 14 (1891), in CATHOLIC SOCIAL
THOUGHT, supra note 28 at 14, 20.
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economic, and social dimensions of the equality in religious dig-
nity taught by the papacy.
As time passed Catholicism came to employ rights-language
in its own social teaching, despite the fact that in the early state
of the dialogue between liberalism and Catholicism the use of
rights-language, so central to the liberal project, was viewed with
concern by many Church leaders. As a result of its encounter
with liberalism there has been an integration of a fuller under-
standing of liberty and equality into Catholic teaching, and this
has permitted the Church to reconsider the validity of rights-talk.
However, Catholicism has not simply adopted the liberal frame-
work in its entirety but has been able to articulate a form of
rights-language which owes a debt to liberalism but which also
offers a number of important correctives to how rights have been
framed within liberalism.3 0
IV. CATHOLICISM AND RIGHTS-LANGUAGE
Simply put, the communitarian perspective of Catholic
social teaching has led the Church to place all rights within the
context of community and to endorse a broader array of rights
than the classical liberal account of rights founded on personal
liberty. Catholic rights-language, in a style similar to welfare-state
liberals, employs economic and social rights as well as civil and
political liberties, but the basis for rights-language is a communi-
tarian reading of the person rather than the liberal foundation
of individual liberty.3 1 Advancing strategies of empowerment
30. On this point see the essay by David Hollenbach, A communitarian
reconstruction of human rights: contributions from Catholic tradition, in CATHOLICISM
AND LIBERALISM supra note 25, at 127-50.
31. Man's social nature makes it evident that the progress of the
human person and the advance of society itself hinge on each other.
For the beginning, the subject, and the goal of all social institutions is
and must be the human person, which for its part and by its very
nature stands completely in need of social life. This social life is not
something added on to man. Hence, through his dealings with
others, through reciprocal duties, and through fraternal dialogue he
develops all his gifts and is able to rise to his destiny.
Among those social ties which man needs for his development,
some, like the family and political community, relate with greater
immediacy to his innermost nature. Others originate rather from his
free decision. In our era, for various reasons, reciprocal ties and
mutual dependencies increase day by day and give rise to a variety of
associations and organizations, both public and private. This
development, which is called socialization, while certainly not without
its dangers, brings with it many advantages with respect to
consolidating and increasing the qualities of the human person, and
safeguarding his rights.
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through social and economic goods like housing, health care,
and education entails rights of entitlement besides those rights
of immunity so dear to classical liberalism. 2 The Catholic con-
cern for a person's ability to participate in the life of a commu-
nity rather than any individualistic notion of freedom abstracted
from social relations offers an alternative formulation of entitle-
ment rights.
From the outset it should be made clear that Catholic teach-
ing acknowledges that a distinction exists between legal and
moral rights. A legal right is sanctioned by civil law; a person can
appeal to the state for its enforcement. Such rights, moreover,
may be constitutional or statutory: a constitutional right is one
that is protected by existing constitutional law; a statutory right is
one which is guaranteed by legislation on the federal or state
level. In order to have legal rights, the subject of such a claim
must belong to the given political or legal community. Moral
rights, on the other hand, are rights which are warranted by
appeal to convincing ethical reasoning and argument. Further-
more, these rights can be, and often are, implemented as legal
rights; but the two categories (legal and moral) are not perfectly
congruent and can even be in conflict. Indeed, moral rights can
at times be violated by existing legal rights. For example, the
right to freedom was violated by those countries which had
legally institutionalized slavery. In short, moral rights may be
embodied in legal systems and frequently are; but whether they
are or are not, they are still rights that are grounded on ethical
argument rather than positive law.
Failure to keep the distinction between moral and legal
rights clear results in considerable confusion when arguing for a
right because the word "right" means different things to different
people.
In the mouth of the lawyer, the sociologist or the historian,
[a right] is quasi-descriptive, i.e. it means that there is an
established rule, whether legal or conventional, which
accords the rights. But in the mouth of the reformer and
moralist, it must necessarily mean: "I believe (for reasons I
am prepared to give) that X ought to have R if he wants
it.
GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 28, at para. 25, in CATHouc SocIAL THOUGHT
supra note 28, at 166.
32. For example, see the rights listed in note 34 infra.
33. S. I. BENN & R. S. PETERS, Tim PRINCaPLE.S OF PoIrrncAL THouGHT:
Soc1AL FOUNDATIONS OF THE DEMOCRATIC STATE 108 (1959).
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Lawyers customarily appeal to existing law to establish the validity
of a particular rights-claim when we are in the realm of legal
rights. But the matter of moral rights involves another kind of
appeal. Rights in Catholic teaching are moral claims which
ought to have legal standing because the claims made pertain to
goods which are essential for a person to participate with dignity
in the life of a society.3 4 While some moral rights are protected
by law, the primary basis for any moral right is not law qua se, but
a moral argument. This approach to rights-language necessarily
leads to a question about the moral argument that is found in
Catholic social teaching for the validity of a right.
Within the Catholic tradition one finds a useful analysis of
rights-language in the manuals of moral theology, those compen-
diums of moral teaching which were used in Catholic seminaries
for many years preceding Vatican II." There, rights were viewed
as having four elements: the subject or holder of the right; the
object or the matter of the right; the title or rationale provided to
confirm the right; and the term or the person(s) who has the
corresponding duty. It will be helpful to briefly comment on
each of these elements in order.
i. The subject of rights- When the Church uses rights-language,
it is ordinarily considering human rights. If a right is a human
right, it must be a right which extends to all persons; it cannot be
limited to some group or class of persons. A human rights-claim
must be universal in scope. About this there is not much debate;
the subject of a human right is any and all human beings.
34. [T] here is a growing awareness of the exalted dignity proper to the
human person, since he stands above all things, and his rights and
duties are universal and inviolable. Therefore, there must be made
available to all men everything necessary for leading a life truly
human, such as food, clothing, and shelter; the right to choose a state
of life freely and to found a family; the right to education, to
employment, to a good reputation, to respect, to appropriate
information, to activity in accord with the upright norm of one's own
conscience, to protection of privacy, and to rightful freedom in
matters religious too.
Hence, the social order and its development must unceasingly
work to the benefit of the human person if the disposition of affairs is
to be subordinate to the personal realm and not contrariwise, as the
Lord indicated when he said that the Sabbath was made for man, and
not man for the Sabbath.
GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 28, at para. 26, in CATHouIc SoCIAL THOUGHT,
supra note 28, at 166.
35. A good example of the manualists' treatment of rights is MARc.LINo
ZALBA, THEOLOGAE MoAus SuMMA II: TRAcTATuS DE mANDATIS DEi ET
Ecc.LSXAE 425-432 (1953).
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ii. The object of rights: A survey of human rights-language
reveals that the objects of human rights-claims have varied con-
siderably. Perhaps the single biggest development is the emer-
gence of social and economic goods as objects for rights-claims.
The variation in the range of objects for a human right has
caused considerable skepticism on the part of those who cannot
see how some could claim as an object of a human right that
which was unknown to another generation. There is also a prob-
lem with specifying the object of a right in such a way that the
claim is so exorbitant as to be impossible to attain.
iii. The title of rights. Perhaps the most troublesome aspect of
rights-language is the title of any right. What is the ground for
making a claim to some good? The appeal to self-evidence is
unsatisfactory to many. If the appeal to rights-language is to be
consistent and persuasive, then rights must be derived from a
more fundamental concept which commands widespread respect
and agreement.
iv. The term of rights: Finally, the difficulty exists of under-
standing whose duty it is to answer the legitimate claim of a
human subject bearing rights. Who must respond to a claim
made by a person that his or her rights are being violated?
The task as outlined, therefore, is to present the Catholic
Church's moral argument for human rights. Such an argument
must present: 1) a convincing title for rights; 2) a defense of
socio-economic rights or entitlements; and 3) an explanation of
the duty incumbent upon others to protect a right. We shall take
up each item through a presentation of the Church's teaching as
found in the pastoral letter of the American bishops, "Economic
Justice for All." 6
In their letter's .opening summary, the bishops make it clear
that, in accord with the consistent teaching of the Church, it is
the dignity of the person which must be served by all social insti-
tutions.3 7 Recapitulating the relational anthropology of Catholic
personalism, the bishops then state, "Human dignity can be real-
ized and protected only in community. In our teaching, the
human person is not only sacred but also social."3 8 And while
they admit a variety of standards for measuring the health of an
economy the bishops assert that "[t]he Christian vision of eco-
nomic life... asks, Does economic life enhance or threaten our
36. U.S. CATHOLIc BISHOPs, ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL (1986), reprinted
in CATHouc SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 28, at 572.
37. Id at para. 13.
38. Id at para. 14.
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life together as a community?" 9 They go on to say that
"[h]uman rights are the minimum conditions for life in
community."40
In the body of the letter, in keeping with the communitarian
outlook, the bishops begin their explanation of the ethical
norms of economic life by presenting "the duties all people have
to each other and to the whole community: love of neighbor,
the basic requirements of justice, and the special obligation to
those who are poor or vulnerable."4 1 Duties to others and the
community are noted first, while individual rights are seen in cor-
respondence to the duties. Life in community generates respon-
sibilities and duties, including duties in the economic realm.
The first duty is that of love of neighbor and solidarity with the
neighbor both near and far, for "being a person means being
united to other persons in mutual love."42
The second duty entails justice and participation. Although
our human vocation is to enter into the fullness of loving com-
munion, we live in a sinful world, and this requires attention to
the fact that the demands of love are sometimes difficult to know
and hard to follow. As the bishops write, "sinful human beings
need more specific guidance on how to move toward the realiza-
tion of this great vision" of God's loving plan for creation.4"
Thus, the church offers assistance through its social teaching
which provides norms of justice. These norms state "the mini-
mum levels of mutual care and respect that all persons owe to
each other in an imperfect world."'
Finally, the third duty is to overcome marginalization and
powerlessness. This is summarized by the bishops: "Basic justice
demands the establishment of minimum levels of participation in the life
of the human community for all persons."45 Overcoming any pattern
of exclusion from the life of the community is fundamental to
meeting the duties of justice according to Catholic teaching.
This is because the communitarian perspective found in Church
teaching emphasizes participation in community as essential to
the realization of human dignity. A reflective reading of the epis-
copal letter suggests that "community" is the root metaphor for
justice in the Catholic imagination and 'justice as participation"
is a way of summarizing the foundational theory which serves as
39. Id.
40. Id at para. 17.
41. Id. at para. 62.
42. Id at para. 64.
43. Id at para. 68.
44. Id.
45. Id at para. 77.
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the title for rights-language in Catholic social teaching.
"[P]articipation is an essential expression of the social nature of
human beings and of their communitarian vocation."46
When the Church wishes to provide more detail as to the
basic demands which are to be derived from its theory of justice
as participation it does so by employing the language of human
rights. In Catholic social teaching, human rights "are prerequi-
sites for a dignified life in community."47 Among these prerequi-
site conditions for communal life are the "fulfillment of material
needs, a guarantee of fundamental freedoms, and the protection
of relationships . ... ""
The full range of human rights was first listed in Catholic
social teaching in Pope John XXIII's "Pacem in Terris."49 Since
then, subsequent popes have added to the list of rights enumer-
ated by Pope John.50 But the teaching has been consistent in its
claim that some human rights "are of a specifically economic
nature" and "[flirst among these are the rights to life, food,
clothing, shelter, rest, medical care, and basic education."51 In
most cases people will satisfy these rights by earning a living, typi-
cally in the American economy through wage-labor. The bishops
go on in their letter to mention other economic rights such as
46. ld. at para. 78.
47. Id. at para. 79.
48. Id.
49. POPE JofN XXIII, PACEM u, TERRIS paras. 11-27 (1963), reprinted in
CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 28, at 129.
50. The bishops at the 1971 Synod wrote of a "right to development"
which is a "dynamic interpenetration of all those fundamental human rights"
which allow for the advancement of those individuals and nations which are in
inhumane conditions that deny human dignity. See SYNOD OF BISHOPS, JUSTICE
IN THE WORLD (1971), reprinted in CATHOUC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 28, at
287, 290. The present pope has written: "The right to a safe environment is
ever more insistently presented today as a right that must be included in an
updated Charter of Human Rights." POPE JO14N PAUL 11, Ti ECOLOGICAL
CaIsIs: A COMMON REsPONSIBILITY para. 9 (1990), reprinted in "AND GOD SAW
THAT IT WAS GOOD": CATHOLIC THEOLOGY AND TIlE ENVIRONMENT 215, 219
(Drew Christiansen, SJ & Walter Grazer eds., 1996).
John Paul II has also claimed that part of the failure of communism was
that it denied people the "human rights to private initiative" and to "freedom in
the economic sector." POPEJoHN PAUL II, CENTESIMUS ANNus para. 24 (1991),
reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 28, at 437.
Such development in an understanding of the conditions for human
dignity was foreseen by the bishops at Vatican H: "God's Spirit, who with a
marvelous providence directs the unfolding of time and renews the face of the
earth, is not absent from this development. The ferment of the gospel, too, has
aroused and continues to arouse in man's heart the irresistible requirements of
his dignity." GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 32, at para. 26.
51. ECONOhMCJusTIcE FOR ALL, supra note 36, at para. 80.
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security in sickness, old age, and unemployment. Thus, there is
clear support for the idea of rights to basic material goods.
Church teaching recognizes that social and economic rights,
entitlement rights, are different than political and civil rights, for
they require a different means of implementation. "Freedom of
worship and of speech imply immunity from interference on the
part of both other persons and the government. The rights to
education, employment, and social security, for example, are
empowerments that call for positive action by individuals and
society at large."52 The American bishops call for "a serious dia-
logue about the appropriate levels of private and public sector
involvement" in securing entitlements and acknowledge that
"[t]here is certainly room for diversity of opinion in the Church
and in U.S. society on how to protect the human dignity and
economic rights" of all persons.53 What must be done first, how-
ever, is to develop "a new cultural consensus that the basic eco-
nomic conditions of human welfare are essential to human
dignity and are due persons by right."54
To sum up the teaching of the Church in this regard it can
be stated that the Church 1) strongly and consistently maintains
the existence of fundamental rights to basic material necessities
to which all persons are entitled; and 2) accepts that there can be
a legitimate diversity in the creation of the social institutions
whereby these rights are to be satisfied. It is in this spirit that one
can understand Pope John Paul II's remarks about the "welfare
state" in his encyclical "Centesimus Annus."55
The Pope readily admits a "task of the state is that of oversee-
ing and directing the exercise of human rights in the economic
sector."56 However, it is not the state alone or even primarily
which has this responsibility, for the duty falls "to individuals and
to the various groups and associations which make up society."57
John Paul is wary that the "so-called 'welfare state"' has expanded
to the point where the principle of subsidiarity has been violated.
While he accepts that the motivation behind such state expan-
sion has been "in order to respond better to many needs and
demands, by remedying forms of poverty and deprivation unwor-
thy of the human person,"58 he also charges that there have been
"excesses and abuses" as well as "malfunctions and defects" all of
52. Id. at para. 81.
53. 1& at para. 84.
54. 1& at para. 83, supra note 49.
55. CEN rESIMUS ANNUs, supra note 28, at 437.
56. Id. at para. 48.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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which are "the result of an inadequate understanding of the tasks
proper to the state."5 9
Because community is central to Catholic social teaching,
there has long been respect for what the tradition refers to as
subsidiarity and pluralism. Subsidiarity requires that no larger
group should usurp the power and responsibility of a smaller
group unless the common good demands that the larger group
render assistance to the smaller entity. Pluralism posits that the
test of a healthy society is the existence of a wide array of organi-
zations and institutions which make participatory community
possible. Within the Catholic tradition there is strong support
for a rich variety of associations which give life and color to com-
munal experience. Subsidiarity underscores that the state's role
is to help these smaller communities achieve their proper aim
and to intervene whenever they are unwilling or unable to make
their distinct contribution to the overall well-being of the person
or the larger community.
Subsidiarity, then, warns any state from assuming too great a
role in public life; but it also warns against any state not fulfilling
its duties to promote the common good. After all, the aim of
multiple associations is to permit persons to realize the variety of
goods which make for human well-being by fostering participa-
tion in communal life. Such participation is crucial, for in Cath-
olic social teaching communal life provides the opportunity to
acknowledge one's relationality by giving oneself away to
another, and in so doing to more fully realize oneself. This
applies as much in economic life as any other realm of human
experience. Community exists not only to secure a person's
rights but to locate a person's duties in the achievement of the
common good. In this way we might see subsidiarity as an instru-
mental norm and pluralism as a practical test, both of which are
meant to serve the foundational values of community and the
common good which, in turn, make for personal well-being.
It must be stressed that subsidiarity should be understood
not only in the historical context of past Catholic social teaching,
but also in the context of contemporary public life and the
threats to human well-being, community, and the common good
which we find there. If we are to adequately grasp what sub-
sidiarity demands, we must be able to presently assess what forces
threaten the basic goods held up by the Church's social teaching.
Surely, Pope Pius XI, who formulated the principle, was right
that the state can endanger these goods, but other forces may
also effectively block participation in communal life and thereby
59. 1&
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prevent a person from making a contribution to the common
good.6" Today, market forces are clearly threatening to large
numbers of people who for a variety of reasons - age, infirmity,
absence of skills - are at risk of having basic needs unmet, needs
which they are entitled by right to have addressed according to
the Church's teaching. Such a prospect may then require of the
state a more direct role in meeting the legitimate demands of
people whose rights are endangered.6 But the precise strategy
for securing those rights of entitlement remains open to public
discussion and will undoubtedly entail a measure of trial and
error in its formulation and execution. 62
60. The formulation of the principle by Pius XI reads: "it is an injustice
and at the same time a grave evil and a disturbance of right order to transfer to
the larger and higher collectivity functions which can be performed and
provided for by lesser and subordinate bodies." POPE PIUS XI, QUADRAGESIMO
ANNO para. 79 (1931), reprinted in CAmroiIc SocIL TiiouGrr 40.
61. [T]he free market is the most efficient instrument for utilizing
resources and effectively responding to needs. But this is true only for
those needs which are 'solvent,' insofar as they are endowed with
purchasing power, and for those resources which are 'marketable,'
insofar as they are capable of obtaining a satisfactory price .... It is a
strict duty of'justice and truth not to allow fundamental human needs
to remain unsatisfied, and not to allow those burdened by such needs
to perish.... Even prior to the logic of a fair exchange of goods and
the forms of justice appropriate to it, there exists something which is
due to man because he is man, by reason of his lofty dignity.
• . . In this sense, it is right to speak of a struggle against an
economic system, if the latter is understood as a method of upholding
the absolute predominance of capital, the possession of the means of
production and of the land, in contrast to the free and personal
nature of human work. In the struggle against such a system, what is
being proposed as an alternative is not the socialist system, which in
fact turns out to be state capitalism, but rather a society of free work,
of enterprise and of participation. Such a society is not directed
against the market, but demands that the market be appropriately
controlled by the forces of society and by the state, so as to guarantee
that the basic needs of the whole of society are satisfied.
CENrIsIMus ANNus, supra note 55, at paras. 34-35.
62. The new federalism currently being championed by critics of the
federal government, is not inherently wrong if it is really about pluralism and
participation, an effort at enacting subsidiarity. When federalism becomes
merely a code-word or strategy for budget cuts, however, it is unacceptable.
Thus, it is quite proper to ask hard questions about recent actions which do
away with entitlements and create block grants to the states. Undoubtedly, we
have too many categorical grant programs at the federal level and permitting
states more discretion to administer and distribute resources is a good thing.
Concern for cost-effectiveness should not automatically be equated with
indifference to the poor, but concern for cost should not be the first
consideration, human dignity must be, and that requires attention to
participatory community and the conditions which make it possible. When
people are effectively marginalized from participation in community their
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What drives the Church's commitment to basic rights is that
unless people are able to join in the life of a community in mean-
ingful ways, there is an obstacle to the possibility of self-donation.
The theological rationale for the emphasis on community is the
doctrine of the Trinity. This fundamental claim about God as
triune suggests that the very nature of God is loving communion
between Father, Son, and Spirit. The God in whose image and
likeness we are created is an eternal communion of self-giving
love. For human persons, therefore, to enter into loving rela-
tionships whereby we give ourselves away to another is to reflect
our true identity as creatures made in the image of a God who is
Trinity. Thus, community is central as the setting which encour-
ages our self-donation as an expression of true creaturehood.
Rights in the Roman Catholic tradition, be they political, eco-
nomic, civil or social, are determinations about the basic condi-
tions necessary for participatory community. This is the
distinctive aspect of Catholic rights-language: it is always contex-
tualized by the moral standard of community and the obligation
of individuals to participate in the community. Such community
is demonstrated both through employment, and the group's obli-
gation to remove those conditions which effectively marginalize
people from the community when employment is not available.
V. CONCLUSION
It should come as no surprise that a tradition which takes as
its foundation the Gospel, which is "good news" for the poor,
should pose a challenge to American society as our nation
engages in a policy debate over entitlements. The nation's bish-
ops have proposed that we have an "obligation to evaluate social
and economic activity from the viewpoint of the poor and the
powerless [which] arises from the radical command to love one's
neighbor as one's self."6 This moral obligation, referred to
within the tradition as "the preferential option for the poor," is a
reminder that "[i]n teaching us charity, the Gospel instructs us
in the preferential respect due... the poor and the special situa-
tion they have in society: the more fortunate should renounce
some of their rights so as to place their goods more generously at
the service of others."64 One of the disturbing aspects of our
dignity is violated; when people refuse to contribute to the creation of
community there is moral failure.
63. ECONOMIC JusTIcE FOR AL, supra note 36 at para. 87.
64. POPE PAUL VI, OCTOGEIMA ADVENIENS: A CALL TO ACTION ON THE
EIGHTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF RERUM NOVARUM para. 23 (1971), reprinted in
CATHOLIC SoCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 28, at 263.
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present situation concerning entitlements is that it is those enti-
tlements aimed at assisting the poor which have received most
criticism and undergone most scrutiny. Programs such as gov-
ernment subsidized school lunches and aid to homeless veterans
have been put on notice but social security payments to upper-
middle and high-income retirees, home mortgage deductions,
and subsidies to business continue. By the standard of Catholic
social teaching, this is a mistaken course of action. Here then are
three lessons which the Catholic tradition offers to the policy dis-
cussion on entitlements. First, it is certain that the tradition of
Catholic social thought defends the existence of entitlement
rights. Second, the Church also accepts that a variety of means
for securing those rights may be utilized and that a large federal
governmental structure is not necessarily the most appropriate
means. Finally, the Church's teaching appeals to our national
and individual conscience to remember that in whatever strate-
gies we adopt it is the rights of the most needy which have a
priority over the entitlement claims of the rest of us.

